FINANCIAL POWER AND STATE ACTION: The Brazilian Central Bank and the Public- Private Entanglements of Interests, Ideas, and Infrastructures
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.9771/ccrh.v37i0.59405Keywords:
Financial power, State action, Public-private relationships, Central bank, Brazilian financial systemAbstract
The article sheds light on how financial actors wield
power over state actions in Brazil by mapping out the
various public-private entanglements concentrated
within the Brazilian Central Bank. The interest
in such intersections and interdependencies has
grown since the 2008 financial crisis, debunking
traditional analyses that treated states and
financial markets as separate domains. The
research organizes the emerging literature on the
subject, arguing that, in the Brazilian context, two
types of connections have been more thoroughly
explored: the complementarity between interests
and macroinstitutions, and personal connections
within the financial system. Aiming at contributing
to these discussions, the article highlights a
third type of public-private entanglement, socalled
infrastructural, discussed internationally.
Finally, the work categorizes three infrastructural
dimensions of finance in Brazil, aiming to guide
future research on the institutional, technical, and
policy intricacies of infrastructural power.
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