Animal Dignity in the justification of animal rights

Abstract

This article approaches the consistency of the idea of dignity in the justification of animal rights. Because of Kant´s theory, dignity is regarded as solely applied to human beings, due to their rationality and autonomy. Can dignity be applied also to other animals? This work will show how four animal ethics philosophers have tackled this problem: Peter Singer, Tom Regan, Gary Francione and Christine Korsgaard. We will see how sentience is the basis to equal consideration of interests between human beings and other animals, without ascribing rights to animals, in Singer´s theory. Regan´s theory, on the other hand, is grounded on the notion that animals should have rights because they are subjects of a life. Francione deems this criterion unclear and restrictive. He claims that sentience should entail inviolability. In order to render inviolable all sentient animals and to prevent that they be regarded as property, Francione argues that sentient animals should be persons. Korsgaard agrees that sentience is the basis for considering animals as subjects of right and adds that they are ends in themselves because of sentience. In contrast to humans beings, though, animals are ends in themselves in a passive sense, which does not prevent that dignity be attributed to them. Korsgaard´s reinterpretation of Kantian theory allows for the link between sentience and dignity. Thus, animal dignity can be a philosophically sound basis for animal rights.