SHARE-BASED COMPENSATION AND ITS ATTRACTIVE VARIABLES AS AN INCENTIVE TO EXECUTIVES AND SHAREHOLDERS
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.9771/rcufba.v17i1.50005Keywords:
Stock-based compensation, Executives, Agency TheoryAbstract
The present study aimed to investigate what are the determinants of the use of the share-based compensation plan. Thus, this article sought to fill the existing gap on executive variable compensation and identify the various impacting variables in this process that involves the agency conflict between shareholders and executives. Studies with this theme are relevant, since the amount paid in shares, in many cases, can reduce the cash outlay, consequently reducing the cost of these companies and the agency conflict, in addition, this adoption seeks to encourage executives to be more involved within organizations, because the better the performance of the company, the higher the remuneration of the executive himself. For the study, companies from the Level I and II segment of corporate governance were used, whose population is 49 companies, excluding financial companies, so the sample had 32 companies listed on the Bolsa, Brasil, Balcão (B3), included in the period from 2010 to 2022. The information initially collected was analyzed from the descriptive analysis and then the Panel Data analysis with fixed effects was performed. The result identified that the average remuneration of the companies' executives represented 0.29% of the Total Assets, showing that the use of stock-based remuneration is more advantageous both for executives and for companies, the panel data analysis showed that the determining variables for executive compensation were: ROA, Tobin's Q, Book Levarage, Independent Directors Ln (Assets) and Percentage of Controlling Shares, in this sense, it is clear that the greater the relevance of compensation paid in shares , the smaller the agency conflict problems.
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