Returning to Dworkin's Criticism on Legal Conventionalism

The defenses presented by Andrei Marmor and Jules Coleman

Abstract

This is an analytical legal theory study, considering debates on how we should understand the very concept of law. It analyzes some of the arguments presented by Andrei Marmor and Jules Coleman in defense of legal conventionalism, considering the criticisms formulated by Ronald Dworkin – particularly in his book "Law's Empire". First, it presents Dworkin's conception of conventionalism, as well the idea of "semantic sting". Subsequently, arguments by Marmor (especially the notion of constitutive convention) and Coleman (the distinction between disagreements of content and disagreements of application) are expounded upon. Finally, the paper examines Dworkin's replies and other arguments he could have formulated. It is argued that conventionalism ends up treating law as a concept to be understood "criterially" and without considering its evaluative point, which is why Marmor and Coleman’s arguments would not rehabilitate legal conventionalism from Dworkinian criticisms.