

Casals' Individual International Artistic Boycott (1945-?)

Silvia Lazo - University of Montana

silvia.lazo@bresnan.net

Abstract: Pau Casals (1876-1973, also known as Pablo Casals) was a notable Catalan cellist, conductor and humanitarian, born in Catalonia (Spain). He went into exile in Prades, France in 1939, towards the end of the Spanish Civil War, subsequently relocating to Puerto Rico in 1957. In October 1945, the apparent lack of Allied intervention in Spain ignited Casals' international artistic boycott, wherein the artist refused to perform in any country recognizing the Franco regime, which included the United States and England. This paper isolates *some* of the variables that impact the persuasiveness of his individual international artistic boycott with respect to two international relations (IR) theories, Structural Realism and Constructivism. Evidence presented in this paper stems from Casals' biographies, performance records, contemporaneous US Foreign Relations archives, academic articles, and newspapers. This analysis reveals that international artistic boycotts fail when not aligned with US national interests or a negative view of the target country by the United States.

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Introduction

Pau Casals (29 December 1876-22 October 1973, also known as Pablo Casals) was a famous cellist, conductor, and humanitarian, born in Catalonia (Spain). At the end of World War II, when the lack of Allied intervention in Spain became apparent, Casals enlarged his existing boycott against Russia (1917)¹, Italy and Germany (1933) to include all nations recognizing Gen. Francisco Franco's regime, thereby asserting an international artistic boycott (1945-?). The boycott especially targeted the administrations of the United States and England. In the sections that follow, the effectiveness of Casals' artistic boycott is analyzed with respect to two international relations (IR) theories, Structural Realism and Constructivism.

Specifically, I consider how each of these theories would answer two questions: first, why international artistic boycotts succeed or fail, and second, why Casals' international artistic boycott failed to persuade the United States to take a stance against Gen. Franco's regime. For Structural Realism, where US interests do not align, international artistic boycotts will fail. Similarly, for Constructivists the answer lies in how the United States views the target nation for intervention. Where the United States sees the target nation as a friend, international artistic boycotts are likely to fail. To test these theories, I employed a qualitative analysis of documentary evidence, including biographies and performance records on Casals, contemporaneous US Foreign Relations archives, academic journals and newspaper articles.

The paper proceeds as follows. First, I examine the history of the Spanish Civil War. Then I explain Casals' international artistic boycott and discuss its effectiveness. Finally, I demonstrate how Structural Realism and Constructivism *explain* the effectiveness of artistic boycotts in general and Casals' artistic boycott in particular. I conclude that Casals' international artistic boycott failed because US interests did not align with those of the boycott, and because the United States did not see Gen. Franco (or his regime) as an enemy. Further, Structural Realism provided the best answer because the evidence more clearly supports the theory.

¹ Since the 1917 Russian Revolution, Casals boycotted the country for what he felt was a blind persecution of his friend Alexander Siloti, whose assets had been confiscated. H. L. Kirk, Pablo Casals: a Biography (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), 239-240.

Brief History of the Spanish Civil War

The 1930s were a tumultuous time in Spain, culminating with the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). The origins of the Spanish Civil War go back to at least 1931, when elections brought to power a Republican majority. King Alfonso XIII went into exile on April 1, 1931, while Niceto Alcalá Zamora, a Catholic landowner from Cordoba, inaugurated Spain's Second Republic².

Between 1931-36 the Second Republic faced major challenges, among them a mounting financial crisis following the Wall Street crash of 1929; The bank of J.P. Morgan & Co.'s cancellation of a 60-million dollar loan agreement made to Spain's prior administration; educational deficiencies; the hasty development of a constitution satisfactory to the majority of the population; the reconciliation of diverse political ideologies; dissension over land reforms; and the separation of church and state³. While Republicanism announced attractive reforms to many who desired greater political and social freedoms such as women's rights to suffrage and divorce, some reorganizations such as the promulgation of Catalonia's autonomy (led by Francesc Macia and Lluís Companys), land expropriation decrees, and the termination of subsidies to the Catholic church displeased various groups, institutions and business sectors who began to contest the new government's legitimacy⁴.

The tensions between those desirous of quicker reforms and those who favored the stability of traditional structures escalated into general strikes, accentuated political fissures, and provided frequent pretexts for recurring military *coups* (such as the one led by Gen. Sanjurjo, April 1932). The lack of political cohesion, the radicalization of political parties, the rise in violent confrontations (such as the burning of convents and churches)⁵, and the recurrent tendency on the part of the government to resort to military force to restore order, were some of the many factors that contributed to the civil

2 Anthony Beevor, "The Second Republic," *The Battle for Spain* (Great Britain: Orbis Pub., 1982; rev. New York: Penguin Group, 2006), 21-33.

3 Beevor, *Battle for Spain*, 21.

4 Beevor, *Battle for Spain*, 22, 23, 25.

5 "A predictable result of the spread of arms to the masses, was the outbreak of a persecution against the church which took gigantic proportions, superior to those of the French Revolution and, probably, to those of the Roman Empire. In them, it would fall 7.000 clerics, including 13 bishops, more than 3.000 lay Catholics for the mere fact of religious choice, half in the first two months." Further, "the chase was also over things, devastating a large heritage: historical and artistic treasures of incalculable value were set to fire." Luis Pío Moa, *Los Mitos de la Guerra Civil* (Madrid: La esfera de Los Libros, 2004), 223.

war. Spanish commentator, Pío Moa notes: "Resentment over the decadence attributed to Catholicism, together with the preaching of the masonry and Jacobin liberalism, made the church, in the mentality of the new revolutionary and Republican forces, the principal obstacle to the modernization of the country. It was necessary to break with the history of Spain, and particularly their religious component⁶." Manuel Azaña (the Second Republic's Minister of War) warned the Socialist factions that preparing an insurrection would give the army a propitious excuse to re-enter politics and crush the workers⁷. Before being dispatched to the Canary Islands early in 1936, Gen. Francisco Franco made a bold and clear statement: "Of one thing I am certain, and I can guarantee, that whatever circumstances may arise, wherever I am, there will be no communism⁸."

In May 1936 General Emilio Mola began planning a new coup to commence on July 18, 1936 to replace the Second Republic. On July 15, 1936 Gen. Franco was persuaded to join Mola. The next day, Franco departed Tenerife, Las Palmas (Canary Islands) for Casablanca, French Morocco. In Spanish Morocco Mola's conspirators, some acting prematurely, had some success over the Civil Guard⁹. Captured Civil Guard members were executed, including, on Franco's order, his own cousin, *Major de la Puente Bahamonde*. On July 18, 1936 triumphs accrued throughout Spain and, on July 19, Franco flew to Tetuán, the northernmost point of Spanish Morocco where he converged with others¹⁰. In a period of three days, Mola's conspirators held about one third of Spain¹¹. To consolidate the remainder of the country (August 1936), Franco established headquarters first in Seville and then in Cáceres¹².

The conquest of Spain would come only after three years of battle with significant support from Hitler and Mussolini (in army and war *matériel*). Historical narratives have loosely aggregated those fighting against the Republic under the term "Nationalists" (led by Franco) and the supporters

Moa, "La guerra civil española en el siglo xx," in *Los Mitos*, 511.

Beevor, "The Second Republic," *Battle for Spain*, 24, 26, 28.

Paul Preston, "The Making of a Conspirator," in *Francisco: A Biography* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 121.

Beevor, "The battle for Spain: the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939," *Battle for Spain*, 56-57.

Ibid., 63-64.

Preston, "The Making of a Generalísimo," in *Francisco*, 148.

Preston, "The Making of a Caudillo," in *Francisco*, 171.

of the government as "Republicans." From 1936-39, an estimated 592,000 people died and 450,000 fled the country. As with many civil wars, a large number of the deaths (324,000) were caused by disease and hunger. The official end to the Spanish Civil War was declared by Franco on April 1, 1939. The Republican army surrendered and Franco's Nationalists (also known as the *Franquistas*) imposed martial law¹³.

Battle of Ebro River and the Policy of Non-Intervention

The Battle of the Ebro River (*la Batalla de l'Ebre*) was one of the most decisive battles in the Spanish Civil War, extending over a period of 113 days. The battle occurred after Nationalists had gained control over most of Spain, although Valencia and Catalonia were still largely under Republican control. The battle zone was largely within Catalonia and was near a strategic entry point to that region. The Battle also involved the Abraham Lincoln International Brigades that fought on behalf of the Republicans against the Nationalists¹⁴. The International Brigades included volunteers from many countries, even antifascists from Germany¹⁵.

On January 26, 1939, Barcelona, capital of Catalonia, fell under the control of the Nationalists. Madrid followed on March 28, 1939¹⁶. There were three exacerbating factors for the defeat: military and political miscalculations on the part of the Second Republican administration; the international 1937 Non-Intervention Agreement; and additional German and Italian support to Gen. Franco's troops.

13 Guilherme Molina-Burguera, "Managing Conflict: The Management and Interpretation of Spanish Civil War Sites," *Conservation and Management of Archeological Sites*, 12, 1 (March, 2010): 39-59.

14 V. Hurtado, A. Segura, A. and J. Villarroya, "La Guerra Civil a Catalunya: Una Mirada Cartogràfica," *Atles de la Guerra Civil a Catalunya*, Universitat de Barcelona, accessed October 22, 2010. <http://www.edicionsdau.com/files/43688>.

15 Josie McLellan, *Antifascism and Memory in East Germany* (New York: Clarendon Press of Oxford University Press, 2004), 27. ISBN: 0199276269.

16 The Vice Consul at Valencia (Wallner) to the Secretary of State, March 28, 1939. *Foreign Relations of the United States*, University of Wisconsin Digital Collections. Accessed October 22, 2011. <http://uwdc.library.wisc.edu/collections/FRUS>.

Second Spanish Republic's Miscalculations

Early in 1939 leadership of the Second Republic made several pleas to the United States for arms, reasoning on account of German and Italian intervention in Spanish affairs. Desperate as the circumstances may have appeared by 1939, the Republican leaders were still optimistic for a victory against Franco's Nationalists: "Senor del Vayo states that while the military situation is undeniably grave neither he nor Negrín regards it as disastrous" (January 12, 1939)¹⁷. Negrín was at the time president of the council of ministers of the Second Republic, having been appointed in 1937 with approval of Azaña. In spite of such assertions by Negrín and others, the overall prognosis to outside observers seemed rather daunting:

The rebel advance on Barcelona continues and apparently is encountering feeble resistance. The lines are believed by Colonel Cheadle to run near Montserrat and Martorell—thus virtually impinging on the Government's last defenses along the Llobregat River. Whether this natural line and the fortification and entrenchments being erected along it will serve as to check the advance is problematic. Most observers are of the opinion that they will not and that the fall of Barcelona is but a matter of days if not hours" (January 23, 1939)¹⁸.

The miscalculations were, of course, not of minor consequence: "Matthews, of the New York Times, who left Barcelona early this morning, says the Llobregat line has collapsed and that the rebels [Nationalists] are now in close proximity to the city" (January 25, 1939)¹⁹. A secondary underestimation involved the external capabilities elicited by Gen. Franco: "The Government knew that from the first of November on German and Italian war *matériel* was pouring in to Franco but that it had greatly underestimated the amount" (February 7, 1939)²⁰. Under such pressures, the Republic's leadership vacillated: "I understand that Azaña has virtually divorced himself from the situation and that he would return to the southern

The Counselor of Embassy in Spain (Thurston) to the Secretary of State, January 12, 1939. FRUS.

The Counselor of Embassy in Spain (Thurston) to the Secretary of State, January 23, 1939. FRUS.

The Counselor of Embassy in Spain (Thurston) to the Secretary of State, January 25, 1939. FRUS.

The Ambassador in Spain (Bowers), Then in France to the Secretary of State, February 27, 1939. FRUS.

area should it be decided to prosecute the war" (February 11, 1939)²¹. The political void resulted in "[p]ower now in the hands of a Council of National Defense headed by General Casado, Commander of the Central Army, and including Besteiro and other moderates which is expected to follow the realistic policy" (March 6, 1939)²². Around March 1939 Negrín became an outcast: "The Republican army leaders had been convinced for some time that it was hopeless to continue the struggle, and they had therefore ousted Negrin when it became evident that he was promoting a Communist *coup*." (March 7, 1939)²³.

The Non-Intervention Agreement

Due to the 1937 Non-Intervention Agreement of the Non-Intervention Committee, the export of arms and ammunition to Spain was prohibited. The International Brigades were also ordered to withdraw. The non-intervention proposal was initiated by France on August 15, 1936. By late August Belgium, England, Germany, and Portugal had followed France's example in "prohibiting the export of a specified list of arms, ammunition, and war material to destinations in Spain²⁴." The International Committee for the Application of the Agreement Regarding Non-Intervention in Spain was adopted on March 8, 1937, with representation of twenty-seven countries²⁵.

International Support to Nationalists

Throughout the war, the Republican government mobilized Spain's gold and silver reserves, negotiated credit facilities through a secret agreement with Stalin dated March 7, 1938, and generated funds through the

21 The Counselor of Embassy in Spain (Thurston) to the Secretary of State, February 11, 1939. FRUS.

22 The Vice Consul at Valencia (Wallner) to the Secretary of State, March 6, 1939. FRUS.

23 The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State, March 7, 1939. FRUS.

24 S.A.H., "Non-Intervention and Neutrality," Bulletin of International News, 13, 5 (August 19, 1936), 3-11.

25- "International Committee for the Application of the Agreement Regarding Non-Intervention in Spain," The American Journal of International Law, 31, 4 (October 1937): 163-170. [Countries represented: Albania, Austria, Belgium, United Kingdom, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Irish Free State, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, Turkey, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia.]

expropriation of civilian resources (compelling the population to turn over personal assets, as well as instituting the "Reparations Fund" against the private deposits of parties fighting against the Republic). In addition, the Republican government was also able to develop added income through export trade²⁶.

Franco's Nationalists on the other hand, received substantial support from Mussolini and Hitler²⁷. Additionally, as previously noted, in 1937, both Italy and Germany became signatories to the Non-Intervention Agreement.

Financial credit was another form of important foreign support to Gen. Franco, totaling approximately \$700 million dollars, an amount roughly equivalent to that available to the Republicans:

The basic mechanism was credit: credit amortized or repaid in very diverse ways over an extended period; credit that made it possible to mobilize an ample supply of foreign resources (precisely those which the zone lacked); credit that involved material support (war equipment, logistics), industrial goods allocated to the economy's war sector, services (freight, personnel) and foreign currency²⁸.

Further Nationalist help arrived in the form of foreign exchanges from democratic nations including the U.S., Switzerland, and England. Nationalists traded approximately 76 million dollars in military aid with companies such as Rio Tinto Ltd. (the largest mining operation of Spain) and the Anglo-American oil industry (Texas Oil, Texaco, Shell, and Atlantic Refining). According to the historian Robert Whealey, additional aid came in the form of information about "technology, logistics, source of supply, and traditional

26 Angel Viñas, "The Financing of the Spanish Civil War," in *Revolution and War in Spain 1931 - 1939*, ed. Paul Preston, (Taylor and Francis e-Library, 2005), ch. 12.

27 [On 15 July, 1936 Hitler agreed to support the military Junta and launched "Operation Magic Fire" (Unternehmen Feuerzuber) where he committed to give Franco 20 aircraft. On July 28, Mussolini too committed to 12 bombers. Over time, both the Italian and German leaders would offer an ever-growing supply of war matériel and troops. Events like these helped turn a fragile coup into a prolonged civil war.] Preston notes: "By 6 August, there were troop-ships regularly crossing the Straits under Italian air cover. The Germans also sent six Heinkel He-51 fighters and nine-five volunteer pilots and mechanics from the Luftwaffe. Within a week, rebels were receiving regular supplies of ammunition and armaments from both Hitler and Mussolini." Preston, "The Making of a Generalísimo," in *Franco*, 162.

28 Viñas, "The Financing of the Spanish Civil War."

business procedure²⁹. Whealey states that foreign exchange contributions made up approximately 12 percent of the support to Franco during the civil war. In conclusion, the Non-Intervention Committee was in fact quite interventionist and, therefore, "was little more than a farce"³⁰.

Casals' International Artistic Boycott

By 1939, Pablo Casals (age 63) was a world renowned classical performer and recording artist. His services were in high demand and commanded top dollar. Casals supported the Second Republic and had held cultural-administrative posts in Barcelona. As Franco's Nationalists defeated the Republicans and marched into Barcelona, Casals went into exile in Prades de Conflent, France, to avoid his own prosecution by the Nationalist military tribunals³¹. Conxita Mir indicates that Casals was in fact tried in absentia in 1940 and received a fine of one million pesetas³².

Between 1939-45 Casals assisted with refugee aid missions through benefit concerts and written pleas to various organizations and eminent persons he knew. After the end of World War II, when the lack of Allied intervention in Spain became apparent, Casals enlarged his antecedent boycotts against Russia (1917), and Italy and Germany (1933) to include all nations recognizing Gen. Francisco Franco (December 1945)³³, thereby asserting an international artistic boycott³⁴. A 1947 letter by Casals to his long-time British management agency, Ibbotson and Tillett, attests to his professional withdrawal: "It is sad that a matter which is so close to my heart has not yet been resolved - the cause of my separation from England!

29 Robert Whealey, "How Franco Financed His War - Reconsidered," *Journal of Contemporary History*, 12, 1 (Jan 1977), 133-152.

30 Whealey, "How Franco Financed His War," 146.

31 D. W. Foard, "Pablo Casals: A Letter Written from Exile." *Moldenhauer Archives* at the U.S. Library of Congress.

32 Conxita Mir, "The Francoist Repression in the Catalan Countries," *Catalan Historical Review*, (2008): 133-147. DOI:10.2436/20.1000.01.9.

33 Kirk, Casals, 433.

34 "Early in the spring of 1945 Casals gave more concerts and made a tour in Switzerland. But, in December, on his seventieth birthday, he decided to not perform in any country that recognized the legitimacy of Generalissimo Franco. Soon thereafter, he decided not to play anymore." Robert Baldock, *Pau Casals (Spain: Ediciones Paidós Iberica, 1992)*, 225.

You can imagine with what impatience we await what UNO [United Nations Organization] will have to say on Spain in the near future. Will they get us out of this terrible suspense which is wearing us down?" (September 26, 1947)³⁵.

Casals' international artistic boycott specifically comprised of a protest in the form of a musical embargo, thus withdrawing himself from a lucrative musical enterprise (concert tours in important nations such as England and the United States).

Casals' main biographer, Herbert L. Kirk, contended that "[b]y the time of the Second World War Casals was a symbol of moral and ethical protest³⁶." Yet, given that the stage can be an ideal platform from which artists may exercise social and political contestation (influencing a captive audience), Casals' boycott might have been self-defeating. This issue might help explain why Casals periodically breached his musical embargo (although asserted through the end of his life, 1973). For example, Casals made public appearances at the annual Prades Festival, started in cooperation with Alexander Schneider in France 1950; appeared at the annual Festival Casals in Puerto Rico, where he lived from 1957 onwards; conducted master classes at the home of Rudolf Serkin in Vermont; performed for Pres. John F. Kennedy at the White House on November 13, 1961; and had three performances before United Nations General Assemblies in 1958, 1963 and 1971.

Additionally, Casals wrote *El Pessebre* (1951), a peace oratorio for mass choir topping 52 concerts worldwide, including broadcasts by radio and television stations in Barcelona, Paris and the United States. Casals called this tour his peace crusade: "the promotion of music with a peace theme to audiences worldwide who want it³⁷."

Casals' celebrity status increased exponentially over the years, musically and politically, standing as an archetypical figure for music achievement and humanitarianism. Responses to Casals' activism confirm this status. For his efforts towards the cause of freedom, world peace, and human rights he was awarded the US Presidential Medal of Freedom (1963) and the UN Peace Medal (1971).

35 Christopher Fifield, Ibbs and Tillett: *The Rise and Fall of a Musical Empire* (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 251.

36 Kirk, Casals, 430.

37 Carlos-Vazquez-Ramos, "Pablo Casals: An Examination of His Choral Works," (PhD dissertation, Florida State University, 2002). ProQuest, UMI 3043366: 42.

Effectiveness of Casals International Artistic Boycott

As mentioned, multiple factors might have hindered the effectiveness of Casals' boycott. Yet, ultimately, his international artistic boycott failed to persuade the United States to take a stance against Gen. Franco. For a short while, however, the United States upheld a UN Resolution dated February 9, 1946 (reaffirmed December 12, 1946) diplomatically alienating the Franco regime from UN members and membership.

In November 1947, the United States decided to change its foreign posture with regards to Spain by advice of its Under Secretary of State who advocated for a strategic reconciliation of economic and diplomatic ties between the two nations.

Why do international artistic boycotts succeed or fail, in general, and why did Casals' international artistic boycott, in particular, fail to change US policy towards Spain? To answer these questions, I will explore two international relations theories: Structural Realism and Constructivism.

Structural Realism (as set forth by Waltz)

Structural Realism, conceived by Kenneth N. Waltz, is a systems theory "composed of a structure and of interacting units. The structure is the system-wide component that makes it possible to think of the system as whole³⁸." Waltz further notes that "Systems theories, whether political or economic, are theories that explain how the organization of a realm acts as a constraining, disposing force on the interacting units within it³⁹."

Waltz conceives of the interacting units as modern nation-states. The organizational principle of the units is anarchy because there is no higher authority among states: "The parts of international political systems stand in relations of coordination. Formally, each is the equal of all the others. None is entitled to command; none is required to obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchical⁴⁰."

In an anarchical system a state must resort to self-help because there are no assurances that any other state will help it to survive and prosper. Waltz further explains that "[a] self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper,

38 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Political Structures," *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 79-101.

39 Waltz, "Reductionist and Systemic Theories," 72.

40 Waltz, "Political Structures," 88.

will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer⁴¹." Waltz believes that this fear causes states to maximize their security and national interests to balance the power (or potential power) of other states: "In any self-help system, units worry about their survival and the worry conditions their behavior⁴²."

The balance-of-power theory is thus a subordinate theory of Structural Realism. Balance of power means that states will engage in internal (expansion of economic and military capabilities) and external (alliance building) efforts to maintain their position within the system. Therefore, in an anarchical system states are more concerned with relative gains derived from self-help, alliances, and bargaining rather than absolute advantages potentially deriving from international specialization (that one country would be in charge of the world's security while others can focus their efforts on other important tasks): "Whether or not by force, each state plots the course it thinks best serve its interests⁴³." Further, "defense spending, moreover, is unproductive for all and unavoidable for most⁴⁴." Waltz' conception of state power expresses as themeasurable combination of a state's capabilities, including size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence⁴⁵.

Another important point in Waltz's theory is the analysis of polarity-the formation of alliances around great powers-as "a structural constraining and shaping behavior⁴⁶":

a) great powers are the important actors in the international system since their capabilities matter;

b) historically the international system has "only two systems to observe" namely, the multipolar and bipolar system;

c) the multipolar system is less stable because the security threat is not clearly defined thus leading to miscalculations: "States often pool their resources in order to serve their interests. Roughly equal parties engaged in cooperative endeavors must look for a common denominator of their policies. They risk finding the lowest one and easily end up in the worst of all

41 Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," 118.

42 Ibid., 105.

43 Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," 113.

44 Ibid., 107.

45 Waltz, "Structural Causes and Economic Effects," 131.

46 D. Copeland, "Neorealism and the Myth of Bipolar Realism," in *Restatements and Renewal*, ed. Benjamin Frankel (Frank Cass, London 1996), 29-89.

possible worlds⁴⁷. "Until 1945 the nation-state system was multipolar and always with five or more powers⁴⁸;

d) In a bipolar world overreaction is the great danger. As Waltz noted "Bipolarity encourages the United States and the Soviet Union to turn unwanted events into crises, while rendering most of them relatively inconsequential⁴⁹." Further, Waltz concludes that "overreaction is the lesser evil because it costs only money and the fighting of limited wars⁵⁰."

Given Structural Realism's notions of balance of power and self-interest, an international artistic boycott would work only when the interests of powerful states and that of the artist aligns.

With respect to the United States' stakes in Spain from the period of 1939 to 1980s,

political, economic and military interests abound which help explain why Casals' artistic boycott failed to meet the Structural Realist burden.

My understanding of Structural Realism leads to two principal hypothesis about the success of an international artistic boycott:

SR1: In Structural Realism, an international artistic boycott fails when it does not align itself with the interests or balancing needs of powerful states.

To test this argument, one may examine evidence that demonstrates that international artistic boycotts fail when they opposed the interests of powerful states.

SR2: Casals' international artistic boycott failed because it did not align with US national political, economic and military interests.

To test this hypothesis the evidence must show that US political, economic and military interests were contrary to that of Casals' and thus the later was subordinate to the first.

US Political Interests

Early in 1939 the American Ambassador in Spain, Claude Bowers, expressed the well-founded concern that Spain increasingly approximated itself to the Rome-Berlin Axis (Mussolini and Hitler): "This [negative publicity towards the United States] all vindicates my conviction, long held and

47 Waltz, "Structural Causes and Military Effects," 170.

48 Ibid., 163.

49 Ibid., 172.

50 Ibid.

expressed, that the foreign policy of Franco is dictated by Germany and Italy, and in the event of a Franco victory this domination certainly will continue and we shall find ourselves with another problem nation in Europe" (January 7, 1939)⁵¹.

Indeed, Germany and Italy had been the first states to recognize Franco's government on November 19, 1936, just a few days after the revolt had begun⁵². Japan recognized Franco on December 1, 1937 after mutual recognition by Franco of Manchukuo (Japan's puppet state). Japan subsequently became closer to the Axis Powers⁵³.

Initially the United States remained reticent about its posture with Spain: during the civil war the United States was a "neutral state" and shortly thereafter, moved cautiously towards the recognition of the new regime. A Press Conference Memorandum dated February 7, 1939 by Sumner Welles, then U.S. Secretary of State, reflected American diplomatic reservations:

That we believe it is primarily a European question and one of more intimate concern to the nations geographically in greater proximity to Spain than the United States and for this reason there was no occasion for any precipitous decision on our part and no decision on the matter had as yet been arrived at by this Government (February 17, 1939)⁵⁴.

Nationalist diplomat, José María Quinones de León's made reassuring statements to the American Ambassador to bridge the US recognition impasse: "The Spanish government in reciprocity [to recognition] is fully prepared to protect the lives and property of Americans and to fulfill the normal obligations of a Spanish Government under international law and treaties" (Paris, March

51 The Ambassador in Spain (Bowers), then in France, to the Secretary of State, January 7, 1939. FRUS.

52 <http://century.guardian.co.uk/1930-1939/Story/0,,127033,00.html> Accessed September 23, 2011.

53 "The Japanese government's international position then grew even more adversarial vis-à-vis the western powers in November, when it decided to boycott the Brussels conference convened by the League of Nations at the petition of China to investigate Japanese aggression and to seek means of ending it. Tokyo had already withdrawn from the League in 1933 and now severed all remaining links with it." Florentino Rodao, "Japan and the Axis, 1937-8: Recognition of the Franco Regime and Manchukuo," *Journal of Contemporary History* 2009; 44; 431: 442. DOI: 10.1177/0022009409104117.

54 Extract from a Memorandum of a Press Conference, February 17, 1939. FRUS.

8, 1939)⁵⁵. On March 29, 1939 based on reassuring statements by General Franco of mercy on detainees and military disengagement with Germany and Italy, France and England recognized him unconditionally⁵⁶. Despite a high degree of uncertainty as to the future deeds of the *Caudillo*, on April 1, 1939 the *New York Times* reported American recognition the Franco regime:

The United States formally accorded diplomatic recognition today to the government of General Francisco Franco in Spain. At the same time President Roosevelt issued a proclamation lifting the arms embargo against Spain on the ground that the civil war in that country had ceased⁵⁷.

Spanish independence from the Axis Powers (Hitler and Mussolini) weighed heavily among American concerns in the region: "The [Spanish] Ambassador stated that it was unconceivable that his Government could ever undertake a policy of friendship with Germany under existing circumstances, and that he was confident, after his own contacts with Spain last autumn, that the Spanish Government would maintain an attitude of rigid neutrality and would try and work out satisfactory economic agreements with France and Great Britain" (November 29, 1939)⁵⁸.

Concern over Spanish neutrality reached an all-time high during World War II: "I would reiterate that our policy in dealing with this Government should be one of bald realism dictated by a careful determination of what Spanish neutrality is worth to the general cause and how it should be secured" (March 1, 1941)⁵⁹.

Despite a temporary shift of policy around 1946 in support of a joint-UN resolution for sanctions against Spain, in 1947 the United States favored

The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State, March 8, 1939. FRUS.

"The recognition of Franco by the British Government has been unconditional, but Mr. Chamberlain declared that the British Government have noted with satisfaction the public statements of General Franco concerning the determination of himself and his Government to secure the traditional independence of Spain and to take proceedings only in the case of those against whom criminal charges are laid." <http://century.guardian.co.uk/1930-1939/Story/0,,102943,00.html>. Accessed September 23, 2011.

"Regime of Franco Recognized by U.S.; Embargo is Lifted," *New York Times*, April 2, 1939. Accessed November 17, 2010, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

Extract from a Memorandum of a Press Conference, February 17, 1939. FRUS.

The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State, March 1, 1941. FRUS.

diplomatic relations with Gen. Franco, which proved militarily beneficial during the Cold War (i.e., bipolarity).

US Economic Interests

Economic considerations also dictated American toleration of Gen. Franco, in part because US investors held significant stakes in Spanish industries. Since 1931 the US Sec. of State Henry Stimson had warned Pres. Herbert Clark Hoover that International Telephone & Telegraph (ITT) was "by far the most important American interest in Spain," with holdings of over 70 million dollars⁶⁰.

The Franco regime initially prevented Col. Sosthenes Behn, CEO of ITT, which had the Spanish concession of CTNE (*Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España*), from returning to his post. The impasse was initially perceived by the U.S. as an ordinary concern over internal instability in Spain: "The critical internal situation may be a factor in the Government's desire to retain administrative control of the company⁶¹." However, American anxieties grew as the situation remained in a stalemate.

Structural Realism explains that exchange of considerations is a predictable course of action where states seek to balance the power of other states. Waltz states that "where the contest is over considerations, the parties seek to maintain or improve their positions by maneuvering, by bargaining, or by fighting." In this case the United States resorted to bargaining rather than fighting⁶². Part of the brokering process centered on ITT's holdings: "Although managerial and mechanical ingenuity contributed to ITT's success during the 1920s, the firm's ability to survive the political upheavals in Spain from 1931 to 1939 was largely determined by its relationship with the State Department⁶³."

During the brokering process, the Spanish Government resorted to a potential exchange in the form of US foreign credit⁶⁴. The reply was positive as noted by Herbert Feis' Memorandum to the US President:

Mr. Welles then said that he wished to repeat those general

60 Douglas J. Little, "Twenty Years of Turmoil: ITT, the State Department, and Spain," *The Business History Review*, 53 (Winter, 1979): 449-472.

61 The Chargé in Spain (Matthews) to the Secretary of State, May 11, 1939. FRUS.

62 Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," 113.

63 Little, "Twenty Years of Turmoil," 449-472.

64 The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Bullitt), May 29, 1939. FRUS.

reflections and ideas which he had already expressed to the Ambassador on the matter of the relationship between Spain and the United States. The Department was interested in this Spanish financing as a step towards the renewal and resumption of normal and satisfactory commercial and economic relationships between the two countries, and that if we undertook it it would be on the supposition that the Spanish Government shared the same will and purpose (June 12, 1939)⁶⁵.

ITT, a US-based multinational telecommunications' company, was at the time led by the Behn brothers-former operators in Puerto Rico and Cuba-whose ambitions intended to turn the corporation into an international system of telecommunications. This grand endeavor was taking place at a critical time during Europe's reconstruction after World War I. On August 24, 1924, ITT began servicing Spain's telecommunication needs through an agreement with CTNE⁶⁶. The company enjoyed greatly enhanced and modernized capabilities until Franco's takeover and for a while CTNE's capital was still held by ITT. In 1945 Franco nationalized the company, taking over its stock from ITT and retaining 41 percent of the share capital, the rest going to more than 700,000 shareholders.

Franco's control continued even posthumously until 1986 when Louis Solana, Board President for CTNE, reaffirmed the company's international orientation. At that point, the company announced various initiatives that included a joint venture with American Telephone & Telegraph Technologies Inc. (AT&T)⁶⁷. Archival information from ITT's V.P. Francis M. White reflects the fruitful bargaining resulting from US diplomatic engagement in Spain. ITT was sold to the Spanish government in 1945 for a total of 83 million dollars plus a contract on equipment supply:

The letters and memos from 1942-1949 also focus on three specific areas. The first is the repatriation of ITT's Spanish subsidiary, Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España (CTNE). ITT negotiated with General Francisco Franco in 1944 in an effort to reap some remuneration from its nationalization. Spain

65 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Adviser on International Economic Affairs (Feis), June 12, 1939. FRUS.

66 Antonio Perez Yuste, "La Creación de la Compañía Telefónica Nacional de España en la Dictadura de Primo de Rivera," *Cuadernos de Historia Contemporánea* (2007): 95-117.

67 "Telefonica S.A., Company's History," accessed November 24, 2010, <http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Telefonica-SA-Company-History.html>.

paid ITT \$33 million in cash and \$50 million in 4 percent bonds. Also, ITT received a service and technical contract that gave it a monopoly over CTNE's equipment⁶⁸.

ITT was just one among many other US companies (e.g., Texas Oil, Texaco, Shell, Atlantic Refining, and Spanish General Motors) negotiating with Gen. Franco during and after the Spanish Civil War. This scenario reflects the degree of American corporate expansion at the turn of the century.

The evidence leads to the conclusion that US economic interests existed in Spain supporting an argument for the strong role that the American Government played in protecting US commercial interests abroad. In "Dictatorships and Double Standards," Jeanne Kirkpatrick elucidates this moral compromise: "Inconsistencies are a familiar part of politics in most societies. Usually, however, governments behave hypocritically when their principles conflict with the national interest"⁶⁹. "Hence, significant economic interest weighted against Casals' international artistic boycott.

US Military Interests

Gen. Franco was cognizant of the Communist threat which he played to his political advantage, signaling his inclination toward international peace and collaboration:

He said the problem in his mind which he wanted to make clear was that if in undertaking the necessarily painful steps of discard and change in the character of the regime whereby at least temporarily the executive power of the government was weakened at a critical and dramatic moment in European affairs and if at the same time the Soviet Government pressed for action on the part of the United States in pursuance and furtherance of the Soviet policy of European domination, the United States Government must not regard Spain as a minor issue, such as that of the presidency of the San Francisco Conference, but as an issue as important as Spain's key strategic geographical position justified and, therefore, should be prepared to resist extreme Soviet demands as in the case of Poland. (May 1, 1945)⁷⁰.

68 Francis M. White, Papers 1913-1961. The Milton Eisenhower Library, John Hopkins University, accessed November 23, 2010, <http://ead.library.jhu.edu/ms194.xml>.

69 Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, "Dictatorships & Double Standards," Commentary, November 1979.

70 The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State, May 1, 1945. FRUS.

After the Berlin Blockade (1948-49) the United States strengthened its relations with Spain with the goal of enhancing its military access to Europe. In 1953 the two nations signed a bilateral defense agreement providing the United States multiple military bases:

The "Pact of Madrid" granted American forces use of these four bases in exchange for significant economic assistance - and implicit acknowledgement of the Franco regime's durability. In 1955 the United States supported Spain's admission to the U.N. despite the continuing reluctance of the U.K. and France. This warming of relations between Washington and Madrid culminated in an official visit by President Dwight Eisenhower to Spain in 1959. For American public opinion, the visit by "Ike" bestowed Spain with an aura of normalcy despite its dictatorial government. But for anti-Franco forces in Spain, and particularly for the political left, the Eisenhower visit and the ongoing base agreements became major focal points for enduring anti-Americanism⁷¹.

The Cold War conflict intensified with the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. Hence, access to Spanish territory provided a significant benefit to the United States, a factor later confirmed during Pres. Ford's 1975 visit to Spain:

In my opening statement at the meeting of the Alliance, I stated the importance of our bilateral military relationship with Spain and its direct connection with the defense of Western Europe. It is interesting to note that in the summary given by Secretary General Luns he noted that there was a consensus that there is a direct relationship between the security of Western Europe and the bilateral U.S./Spanish military relationship. He used the word "unanimous" (all 15) recognition of the importance of our bilateral relationship to the security of Western Europe. I am told that this is the first time that this has been recognized. It was of course stated in the Council--not publicly--but it is my impression that this change of attitude can only be beneficial for Western Europe. This new attitude is pleasing to me and I am sure it will bear fruit in the years ahead⁷².

In the end, US political, economic and military interests favored an alliance with Gen. Franco: "So long as peaceful evolution toward a united and liberalized Spain continues to be our objective, we must be realistic enough to accept the fact that successive and partial steps are not only

71 "US-Spain Relations from the Perspective of 2009," Amb. Adrian A. Basora, Foreign Policy Research Institute (Nov 2009) accessed November 23, 2010, <http://www.fpri.org/enotes/200911.basora.usspain2009.html>.

72 Pres. Ford, The White House, Washington: Memorandum of Conversation, May 31, 1975 at Moncloa Palace, (Spain) 3:45pm. Gerald R. Ford Library, 2.

necessary but an integral part of a process of peaceful change" (February 15, 1946)⁷³.

Conclusions on Structural Realism

Casals was one among many citizens of Spain who looked forward to the end of World War II in sincere hope that the Allies would make a move against Gen. Franco: "I told the secretary that England and the other members of the United Nations had a clear moral duty to see democracy restored in Spain. I reminded him of the disastrous role of the Non-Intervention Agreement in helping Franco overthrow the Spanish Republic⁷⁴. After several months lobbying members of the British House of Commons, Casals seemed to have come to the conclusion that conversations were altogether ineffective—he apparently dismissed a private conference with British politician, Sir Stafford Cripps: "We would speak different languages. You would speak about politics and I would speak about principles⁷⁵." In response, Casals enacted an individual international artistic boycott⁷⁶.

Casals was unaware of the powerful dynamics involving foreign policy, and the incertitude of humanitarian intervention in an anarchic international system:

Anarchy's effects are obvious in the ability of the United States and other NATO countries to flout the NATO Charter, ignore their obligations as United Nations members to obtain a Security Council resolution authorizing war, and disregard international "norms" against intervening in the domestic conflicts of other states. Moreover, in the absence of a world government, the United States and NATO were not obliged to intervene in similar ways in similar conflicts elsewhere in the world⁷⁷.

Applying the facts under a theory of Structural Realism, impediments to an international artistic boycott can be readily discerned. Unfortunately

73 The Chargé in Spain (Butterworth) to the Secretary of State, February 15, 1946. FRUS.

74 Pablo Casals, *Joys and Sorrows*, by Albert E. Kahn (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970): 249-266.

75 *Ibid.*, 257.

76 *Ibid.*

77 Karen Ruth Adams, "Structural Realism: The Consequences of Great Power Politics," in *Making Sense of International Relations Theory*, ed. Jennifer Sterling-Folker (CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006), 18.

for Casals and several thousand refugees, his individual international artistic boycott was unable to induce a short-term US foreign policy change toward Spain due to countervailing American political, economic, and military interests. The lack of military intervention allowed Gen. Franco to remain firmly in power until his death in 1975.

Constructivism (e.g., as set forth by Wendt)

In "Anarchy is What States Make of It" Alexander Wendt explains that inter-state behavior, that is, whether states will be friends or foes, will recognize each other's sovereignty, and so on, is contingent upon mutually created identities: "A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meaning that the objects have for them. States act differently towards enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not⁷⁸."

In Constructivism, states start off relations with one another without *a priori* conceptions. Through successive social acts-gestures signal intentions leading to developing mutual knowledge (interpretations) and responses (new gestures)-each state construes a relatively stable concept of self and others (identities). The socialization process of identity formation is thus cognitive and mutually realizing ("reciprocal typifications"): "The process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a 'social act' and begins the process of creating intersubjective meanings. The first social act creates expectations on both sides about each other's future behavior: potentially mistaken and certainly tentative, but expectations nonetheless⁷⁹."

Wendt states that once formed identities carry the basis of interests: "Identity, with its appropriate attachments of psychological reality, is always identity within a specific, socially constructed world⁸⁰." Formed collective meanings may be further institutionalized -internalized as codified norms and rules- bearing the coercive power of a social fact.

The total sum of states' understandings (cumulative knowledge) is simultaneously informed by and constitutive of the relations that follow: "Identities and collective cognitions do not exist apart from each other; they

78 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," *International Politics*, ed. Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (USA: Longman, 2011): 70-78.

79 *Ibid.*, 75.

80 *Ibid.*, 71.

are 'mutually constitutive'⁸¹. "Subjective meanings are also situational, thus changing and morphing depending on the circumstances, and thereby, new meanings and interests are invented *de novo*⁸². Hence, there are an infinite number of potential security systems outcomes defined along a spectrum: competitive (generated by a negative identification where the gain to one means the loss of another: "Power politics will necessarily consist of efforts to manipulate others to satisfy self-regarding interests"⁸³), individualistic (a state is indifferent to others units), or cooperative (positive identifications wherein the security of each is the responsibility of all.).

Based on the foregoing summary of Constructivism, identities and meanings are created and/or altered over time, depending on the interactions between states and present conditions. Consequently, interests and alliances re-position to affirm new identities and interactions. From this summary I derive two hypotheses:

C1: States will support international artistic boycotts of artists where the target state (or its leader) to be boycotted is seen as an enemy and not as a "friend."

The evidence necessary to disprove this hypothesis can be that states have supported artistic boycotts of artists where the target-nation to be boycotted was seen as a friend. The evidence may also demonstrate that where a target-state is not seen as a real enemy, international artistic boycotts have been ineffective.

C2: The United States would have supported Casals' international artistic boycott only if they saw Spain (or Gen. Franco's regime) as an enemy.

Where the United States would find Spain as a "situational ally" (and not an enemy), Casals' international artistic boycott would have been meaningless or would have become largely secondary to the interactions (self-interests) of the two nations.

US-Spanish Relations

Since the Spanish-American War (1898), US-Spanish relations had been locked in a stalemate. The United States viewed Spain with indifference and Franco viewed the United States in a negative light. Indeed, three major

81 Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," 72

82 Ibid., 71.

83 Ibid., 72.

events deeply affected Gen. Franco's during his military tenure: the loss of Cuba to the United States, Catalan regionalism, and the unsuccessful colonial enterprise in Morocco⁸⁴.

It is clear that Franco's conservative tendencies, described as "parafascism," did not conform to Western political and economic liberalism: "The characteristics of this government must be its capacity, authority and orientation in accordance with the aspirations of the National Movement. Hierarchic, authoritarian, with a deep sense of [Catholic] social justice and corporative in structure, to reach through the Municipal, Family, Associations and Incorporations the participation of all in the governance of the State⁸⁵."

Over a considerable period of time, successive cordial gestures moved the United States from a position of "mild encouragement⁸⁶" to an open friendship with Gen. Franco. Some of Franco's "positive signals" included the release of 89 US prisoners, the evacuation of French refugees, payment of \$83 million dollars to American investors for the purchase of ITT, the non-recognition of Mussolini, extension of the 1944-45 ATC (U.S. Air Transport Command) Protocol, and approval of the "Pact of Madrid" in 1953. United States gestures included the extension of cotton and wheat credits to Spain, petroleum supply, positive trade agreements, and public support (see, e.g., 1947 UN Resolution).

One of the first "social acts" concerning the two nations occurred between January and July 1939, during negotiations over American POWs by the Sec. of State Sumner Welles (1937-43): "I said to the [Spanish] Ambassador that, as he well knew, the Department of State had gone out of its way to evidence in every practicable way its desire to cooperate in a friendly manner with the Spanish Government⁸⁷." Gradually, optimism paralleled the formation of positive identities:

84 Preston, Franco, 7.

85 Ismael Saz Campos "Salamanca, 1937: Los fundamentos de un Régimen," in *Fascismo y Franquismo* (Spain: Universitat de València, 2004), 138.

86 "While no illusions now are entertained, mild encouragement is derived from the recent visit of a group of members of the French Parliament and evidence of a growing sympathy with the government cause in England and the United States." The Counsel to the Embassy in Spain (Thurston) to the Secretary of State, January 12, 1939. FRUS.

87 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary (Welles), Washington, November 7, 1939. FRUS.

You should say that when this [US] Government was approached by representatives of the Spanish Government with a view to obtaining credits for the purchase of American Cotton, this Government expressed its willingness to give favorable consideration to the proposal because of the fact that normal and friendly relations existed between the two Governments (July 22, 1939)⁸⁸.

The following communication displays all of the signs of a constructive language (e.g., domestic image, propaganda, humanitarian gestures) constitutive of collective understandings:

Another matter which will require very careful handling is the question of publicity. This should in my opinion be directed deliberately toward strengthening that moderate elements of the present regime in Spain by sharing any resulting credit with these elements and to avoid giving any basis for Axis propaganda which might allege that Spain had been bought or influenced by humanitarian aid. It might be well in this connection to consider the possibility of laying the greatest emphasis on a gesture between the two heads of states and to play down correspondingly any suggestion of charity to a country which after all desires to believe that it is in a position to take care of its needs if normal credits were available (October 8, 1940)⁸⁹.

However, as Wendt points out, relationships may suffer adjustments due to mistaken interpretations of signals or shifting conditions: "The distribution of power may always affect states' calculations, but how it does so depends on the intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the 'distribution of knowledge,' that constitute their conceptions of the self and other. If society 'forgets what university is, the powers and practices of professor and student cease to exist; if the United States and Soviet Union decide that they are no longer enemies, 'the Cold War is over'⁹⁰."

Because meanings are "situational," modifications of conduct may occur as evidenced, for example, in US-Spanish relations mid-twentieth century. Around March 1945, the self-assuring mood of a foreseeable post-war victory brought the Allies to re-evaluate their status (identity) under a new world order. At this juncture, US sentiments towards Spain split between sympathetic

88 The Secretary of State to the Ambassador of Spain, Washington, July 22, 1939. FRUS.

89 The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State, October 8, 1940. FRUS.

90 Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It", 71.

feelings towards the Spanish people and antagonistic feelings towards Gen. Franco:

[This Government] considers that while the present regime remains in power it will be difficult for Spain to assume its proper role and responsibilities in the field of international cooperation and understanding. While this Government and the American people entertain the most friendly feelings toward the Spanish people and desire a development of genuinely cordial relations between the United States and Spain, public sentiment in this country is profoundly opposed to the present Spanish Government, both because of its policies and acts, which until recently have been distinctly unfriendly to the interests of the United States, and because that Government and the Falange Party were founded on undemocratic principles (March 13, 1945)⁹¹.

The excerpt indicates that as a result of its newly acquired identity as "world power" the United States held high expectations with respect to nations which it considered a friend:

He [Franco] must realize that the Falange represented for our people the symbol of the collaboration with our enemies during the days when the war was not going so well for us. We realized that Spain had gone through difficult days. No one wished to see the country again plunged into civil war or civil strife. But we had hoped to see an evolution in the government take place that would be in line with the trend of events and the new spirit abroad in the world (March 24, 1945)⁹².

As political conditions progressed, however, both nations actively engaged in efforts to shape public opinion and image: "I then asked the Minister how the 'evolution' was progressing. He said that several important decisions are about to be reached. Franco is planning the establishment of a 'Monarchical form of government.'" However, "the King, however, will not assume the power until Franco either dies or abandons office" (April 12, 1945)⁹³. Further, Gen. Franco hastened to create an atmosphere of "progress" by putting under legal consideration of the Cortes a Spanish Bill of Rights, opening the country to the foreign press, lifting the death penalty for civil war crimes,

91 The Department of State to the British Embassy, March 13, 1945. FRUS.

92 The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State, March 24, 1945. FRUS.

93 Memorandum Conversation by the Ambassador in Spain (Armour), April 12, 1945. FRUS.

abolishing the military tribunals, and re-casting the function of the Falange as a "movement" and not a "party"⁹⁴."

Though encouraging, these modest gestures on Franco's part were insufficient to secure him immunity from international condemnation around 1945-46: "The U.S. supported the Resolution with respect to Spain passed on June 19, 1945 by Commission I of the U.N. Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, barring the country from membership. This position was reiterated in the declaration made by the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics at Potsdam on August 2, 1945" (December 22, 1945)⁹⁵.

Franco quickly strove to dispel "misconceptions" about his regime: "The Falange was, he insisted, not a political party but rather a grouping together of all those having a common interest, an objective—the welfare of Spain, the maintenance of order, the development of the country along sound religious, cultural, and economic lines et cetera. It was open to anyone to join and included representatives from all walks of life" (March 24, 1945)⁹⁶. Further, Franco argued for the *social nature* of his cause—ultimately to lead the nation to a more stable, peaceful, self-determined development, protected from the threat of communism: "Revolutionary characteristics of national movement with emphasis on social justice, Catholic religion and national unity. Paradox that this is misunderstood abroad precisely by sectors who should be most interested. Peculiarly Spanish quality of movement stressed. Spain does not need and should not import political ideas from abroad (July 18, 1945)⁹⁷.

In December 1945, Franco issued a compelling rationalization, on account of self-determination, in an attempt to restore the reputation of his administration:

Continual testimonials of friendship for Spain belie the supposition that there exists in the Nation any fundamental political problem to be solved, for, all attempts at agreement between antagonistic elements having failed in their day, it solved its own problem more than six years ago with the victory of national arms. In a manner similar to that in which, all

94 Ibid.

95 The Acting Secretary of State to Ambassador in France (Caffery), December 22, 1945. FRUS.

96 The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the secretary of State, March 24, 1945. FRUS.

97 The Ambassador in Spain (Armour) to the Secretary of State, July 18, 1945. FRUS.

peaceful means having failed, the world solved its (problems) by means of the recent war. This national victory represented for Spain a spiritual and material rebirth (December 30, 1945)⁹⁸.

Due to its prominent (permanent) status as a forming member of the United Nations, the United States briefly assumed an alignment with the institutional rules and norms of the organization. As such, the United States voted for the resolution introduced by Panama and Mexico against Spain, during the first UN Conference in London (1946). In this resolution, UN members were asked to examine their relations with Spain acting in accordance with the letter and spirit of the declarations (Figure 1) and bar Spain from UN membership.

32(1). RELATIONS OF MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS WITH SPAIN

1. *The General Assembly* recalls that the San Francisco Conference adopted a resolution according to which paragraph 2 of Article 4 of chapter II of the United Nations Charter "cannot apply to States whose regimes have been installed with the help of armed forces of countries which have fought against the United Nations so long as these regimes are in power."

2. *The General Assembly* recalls that at the Potsdam Conference the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Soviet Union stated that they would not support a request for admission to the United Nations of the present Spanish Government "which, having been founded with the support of the Axis powers, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, does not possess the necessary qualifications to justify its admission."

3. *The General Assembly*, in endorsing these two statements, recommends that the Members of the United Nations should act in accordance with the letter and the spirit of these statements in the conduct of their future relations with Spain.

6. *Twenty-sixth plenary meeting, 9 February 1946.*

Figure 1. UN Resolution on Spain adopted February 9, 1946. Reaffirmed December 12, 1946.

98 Unofficial Memorandum Issued by the Spanish Government, December 30, 1945. FRUS.

Unsatisfied with what was perceived as still "weak results" obtained from this February 9, 1946 Resolution, France sought a redress by adding increasing pressure upon the United States and England, alleging that the Spanish regime posed a threat to international peace and security. On April 17, 1946, Poland joined in formally introducing the issue before the UN Security Council, bringing forth four formal charges against Spain.

After much discussion, the findings were rather ambiguous: (i) three of the charges brought against Spain were unfounded (atomic bomb preparation, alleged offensive military power, and preparation for attack against France); and (ii) Spain did not pose a present threat to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security. Yet, the committee reported that Franco's activities constituted a *potential* for menace⁹⁹, and thus issued a general recommendation that diplomatic relations with Spain should be terminated.

After World War II, the United States was reluctant to embrace the idea of re-igniting any conflict in the region: "Majority of people in England and America are not interested in having Spanish question activated at this time in a manner which would lead to needless violence and disorder" (March 1, 1946)¹⁰⁰. Therefore, the United States reiterated its commitment to the cooperative system formed under the umbrella of the United Nations: "Pending such a finding [that the Spanish regime posed a *present* threat to international peace and security], we are opposed to any inconclusive action by the United Nations because it would be best calculated to aid Franco by uniting the Spanish people against outside interference, or to precipitate the Spanish people themselves into the disaster of civil war with unknown but inevitably costly consequences" (November 12, 1946)¹⁰¹. Consequently, the February 9, 1946 Resolution was reaffirmed on December 12, 1946 with a recommendation "that all members of the United Nations immediately recall from Madrid their Ambassadors and Ministers Plenipotentiary accredited there." The United States and other member nations concurred with the exception of Argentina. Hence, positive interactions with other UN members cognitively translated into greater international cooperation between its members.

99 The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Johnson) to the Secretary of State, June 1, 1946. FRUS.

100 The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, March 1, 1946. FRUS

101 The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State, November 12, 1946. FRUS.

As the year 1947 began the Spanish question continued to gain momentum in American circles. Spanish exiles-including rotating heads of the Second Republic "Government-in-Exile": Juan Negrin, José Giral y Pereira, and Rodolfo Llopis-met with the foreign officials of several nations, including the United States to ask support for a potential regime change in Spain.

In response to the conspiratorial conditions set upon him, Franco pulled out all the stops calling on general elections (characterized by foreign governments as deceitful on account that the press censorship prevented true opportunities for public discussion); suppressing the "26 Points" of the Falange from Spanish constitutional basis; and seeking private conferences with various international parties, including the US Chargé in Spain on July 27, 1947. His efforts prevailed due to the lack of feasible alternatives-attempts at reconciling conflicting Spanish political forces (Spanish monarchists, republicans, and socialists) had proven, to date, unfruitful: "The Staff remains unconvinced that the leaders of the present regime in Spain would accept the proposal [for peaceful removal] or that a sufficiently cohesive opposition exists to take over the government successfully" (October 24, 1947)¹⁰².

Casals' main biographer, H.L. Kirk, suggested that Casals' name had surfaced as a potential contender to the Spanish seat in 1940:

Casals was asked by the council of the government in exile to become its president. He refused; more than thirty years later exiled Spaniards still believed that Pablo Casals was the one man who could have held the dissident elements together and that, had he accepted, his authority and the stand he maintained would have had enough impact on other governments to change their pragmatic accommodation of the Falangist regime in Spain in the decades after World War I¹⁰³.

Precedents existed as to "artist turned head-of-state." A case in point is Ignacy Paderewski (1860-1941), world famous pianist and composer that, from exile, organized political activities, ultimately becoming Poland's Prime Minister. Another example is Czech writer Václav Havel (1936-), synonymous with the Velvet Revolution, who assumed the role of President. And more recently, Wycleff Jean-founder of the band "the fugees" sought to lead Haiti. Yet, many facts cast doubt that Casals would have agreed to be Spain's political leader. Diplomatic documentation shows no indication of Casals as

102 Top Secret PPS/12, Washington, October 24, 1947.FRUS.

103 Kirk, Casals, 430.

a prospective front-runner. To the contrary, the USChargé in Spain, Paul T. Culbertson, reiterated Americanfrustrated hopes that a leader would suffice: "The opposition elements inside and outside of Spain have been living in the false expectation that we and the other powers would unseat Franco and place them in control. None of these elements has ever seemed to figure out the mechanisms for this change. In fact, they probably never tried" (December 30, 1947)¹⁰⁴.

Culbertson's criticism wagered that Franco dissidents preoccupied themselves with the ideologicaltask of condemnation of Franco rather thanthe practical aspects of political harmony and nation building. As a result, US policyshifted toward normalization of relations with Spain: "While no public announcement should be made of our views, we should have in mind the objective of restoring our relations to a normal basis, irrespective of wartime ideological considerations or the character of the regime in power" (October 24, 1947)¹⁰⁵.

A "Top Secret" memo (1947) by George F. Kennan, Policy Planning Staff to Secretary of State, advocated for a complete reversal of US foreign policy, and towards the strengthening of an alliance with Gen. Franco:

At present, our relations with Spain are governed in part by the United Nations Resolution of December 12, 1946, recommending that member states withdraw their Chiefs of Mission from Madrid and that Franco Spain be excluded from Organizations connected with the U.N¹⁰⁶. Further, The Staff believes that, in the National interest, the time has come for a modification of our policy towards Spain with a view to early normalization of US-Spain relations, both political and economic. (Fig. 2)¹⁰⁷.

When a third round of UN deliberations came about on December 1947, the United States voted against the reaffirmation of previous sanctions against Spain (Figure 2).

104 The Charge in Spain, Culbertson, to the Secretary of State, December 30, 1947. FRUS.

105 Top Secret PPS/12, Washington, October 24, 1947. FRUS.

106 Top Secret PPS/12, Washington, October 24, 1947. FRUS.

107 Ibid.

Before any economic measures can be taken, the question of Spain is expected to come up in the United Nations. Spain is on the agenda of the Political Committee and we may be called upon to take a position in respect to one aspect or another of the problem. The Staff is of the opinion that at the present session of the General Assembly, this Government should do everything possible to minimize discussion of the Spanish question. We should endeavor to discourage any action, whether under the Resolution of December 12, 1946, or in the form of a new resolution. In particular, we should refrain from any mention of our previous support of the action of the United Nations in condemning the Franco regime. The Department's position paper on this subject states that we should reaffirm such support. This, the Staff believes, should *not* be done.³

In the event that a resolution is introduced seeking to impose economic sanctions, break diplomatic relations, or otherwise strengthen last year's resolution, we should oppose the proposal. On the other hand, if a resolution should be introduced recommending that the provisions of the December 12, 1946, resolution now be rescinded, we could either vote in its favor or abstain. The Staff is inclined to the opinion that, in line with its recommendation for a change in our policy toward Spain, we should support such a resolution,⁴ stating that the measures opposing Franco have not proved efficacious and that their continuation does not appear warranted by circumstances.

³ In the margin Marshall wrote "I agree GCM" with reference to the words "should *not* be done".

⁴ In the margin Marshall wrote "I agree GCM" with reference to the words "should support such a resolution".

Editorial Note

On November 17, 1947, a proposed reaffirmation of the resolution of December 12, 1946, failed to receive the necessary two-thirds majority of votes in the United Nations General Assembly. The United States voted against the proposed reaffirmation but voted in favor of a resolution, which was adopted, expressing confidence that the Security Council would exercise its responsibilities under the Charter as soon as it considered that the situation in Spain so required (U.N. document A/P.V. 118).

Figure 2. Foreign Relations, "US Policy Toward Spain, PPS/12, Top Secret, Washington, October 24, 1947," University of Wisconsin Library (1947, III).

In sum, a qualitative analysis of documentary evidence shows that in 1939 the United States formed a cordial view of the Spanish government, briefly compromised in 1946, and eventually resumed during the Cold War. The period spanning 1939-53 can be viewed as a period of significant "identity formation" where, while the US did not particularly view Spain as a "close friend," it certainly did not view Gen. Franco as an "international predator." In the lack of political alternatives, Franco's moderate dictatorial regime prevailed.

The period spanning the Cold War revisited US cognitions about Franco resulting in stable relations with Spain. American Presidents Eisenhower (1959) and Ford (1975) paid social visits to the Spanish dictator, illustrating and consolidating positive interfaces between the nations and their leaders:

President Ford arrived in Madrid for talks that intended to ease the way towards a new agreement that will keep United States air and naval bases in Spain. Mr. Ford, who said his visit was undertaken in 'the recognition of Spain's significance as a friend and partner' received an elaborate and friendly greeting from Generalissimo Francisco Franco and tens of thousands of Spaniards¹⁰⁸.

Pres. Ford countered the "warm welcome" provided by Gen. Franco by furthering the diplomatic courtship:

I want to thank you for the very warm welcome that I received at the airport. The ceremony was very impressive. The warmth and friendship which was accorded me by the welcoming crowds was very moving. I cannot thank you enough for the welcome of your people. Let me say, Your Excellency, that I bring to you the wishes of friendship of the American people. Our relationship in the diplomatic, economic and military areas is good today and we look forward to a fine continuation and an improved relationship in the future¹⁰⁹.

Franco emphasized the positive traits of the United States, referring to US power and capabilities, and its ability to maneuver negative press and public opinion, to cement a "flexible" international arrangement inclusive of both democratic and dictatorial regimes:

This is our desire as well. We are convinced of the strength of the United States and that it has the means to win any struggle. We are not impressed by the malicious campaign in the press against the United States. We know that the United States is a powerful ally and has a record of making great sacrifices¹¹⁰...

In the end, the "flexible arrangement" model prevailed in terms of US foreign policy during the Cold War and beyond.

Conclusions on Constructivism

Casals' criticism of US "appeasement policies" of Gen. Franco was not unfounded. A general concern of widespread dictatorialism/totalitarianism had been foretold by the Prime Minister of the Spanish Republic, Delos Rios, in his 1939 plea for more armaments to defend the Republic:

108 "Major events of the Day," New York Times, Sunday, June 1, 1975, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

109 Pres. Ford, The White House, Washington: Memorandum of Conversation, May 31, 1975 at Moncloa Palace, (Spain) 1:30pm. Gerald R. Ford Library, 1.

110 Pres. Ford, Washington: Memorandum of Conversation, May 31, 1975, 3.

Mr. President, the outcome of the struggle in Spain will decide what Europe and South America will be; therefore, it will determine the course of the world that is to be. History will be severe toward those statesmen who have shut their eyes to evidence and towards those whose indecision in this critical hour leads them to risk the principles of tolerance, harmony, liberty and high morale justly attributed to democracy in Your Excellency's speech (January 9, 1939)¹¹¹.

Subsequently, in Latin America and elsewhere governments fell to military coups and dictatorial regimes of varying degrees: Fidel Castro in Cuba, Hu Jintao in People's Republic of China, and Kim II-sung in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Yet, such regimes were tolerated and, indeed supported, by the "great powers" on account of strong national interests abroad. In the case of Spain, in particular, Casals' international artistic boycott faced numerous challenges that ultimately tipped US-Spanish relations towards deeper engagement and permanent alliance with Gen. Franco.

Constructivism demonstrates that the United States kept friendly relations with Spain helping to explain why US intervention did not suffice, presenting a clear impediment to the effectiveness of Casals' artistic boycott. Constructivism, however, might provide a weaker answer due to underlying US political, economic, and military concerns in Spain, which make it difficult to determine the true motivations behind a bilateral alliance with Spain. As noted by Robert Jervis: "the central objection to constructionism is that it mistakes effect for cause¹¹²." "What is crucial is not people's thinking, but factors that drive it¹¹³."

General Conclusions

Q1. Where an international artistic boycott goes against powerful national interests, it will fail. Because Casals' international artistic boycott did not align with US interests, it failed to persuade the United States to intervene in Spain deposing Gen. Franco.

Q2. Where states see the "target nation" as a friend (or situational ally) an international artistic boycott will fail. Because throughout Casals'

111 The Spanish Ambassador (De los Rios) to the Secretary of State, Washington, January 9, 1939. FRUS.

112 Robert Jarvis, "The Era of Power Peace," in *International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues*, ed. Robert Jarvis (Boston: Longman, 2011), 377.

113 Ibid.

international artistic boycott, the United States did not see Franco as an enemy, Casals' boycott was, for the most part, ineffective.

Further research on artistic boycotts may offer additional insights as to its persuasion by the isolation of additional variables. These findings may be further enhanced by the posing of additional questions: 1) what are the instances where artistic boycotts have tipped the balance of a nation's attitude toward another state?; 2) how important is it to distinguish between individual boycotts and larger ones?; and finally, 3) are there disadvantages to "silent artistic boycotts" as compared to performative ones?

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